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Abstract 
We study a principal agent model where agents derive a sense of pride when accomplishing 
production goals. As in classical models, the principal offers a pay-per-performance wage to 
the agent, determining the agent’s extrinsic incentives. However, in our setting, the principal 
does also want to set goals that affect the agents’ intrinsic motivation to work. Agents differ in 
their personal standard which determines what becomes challenging and rewarding to them, 
and hence the intensity of their intrinsic motivation to achieve goals. We show that, at the 
optimal contract, the agents’ production, as well as the goals set by the principal, increase 
with the agents’ personal standards. Thus, although goal setting is payoff irrelevant, since it 
does not directly affect agents’ wage, it increases agents’ achievement and hence the 
principal’s profits. Moreover, we show that a mediocre standard agent could end up being the 
most satisfied one. (JEL. D82, D86, M50, Z13) 
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The object of living is work, experience, and happiness. There is joy in
work. All that money can do is buy us someone elses work in exchange
for our own. There is no happiness except in the realization that we
have accomplished something. Henry Ford, founder of the Ford Motor
Company.2
1 Introduction
In 1968, the American Pulpwood Association became concerned about how to increase
its loggersproductivity as mechanization alone was not increasing the productivity
of its logging crews. Two Industrial Organization psychologists Edwin A. Locke
and Gary P. Lathamassured the rms managers that they had found a way to
increase productivity at no nancial expense to anyone. The policy seemed too easy;
it merely involved setting specic production goals for the loggers. The novelty was
that these goals were wage irrelevant, in contrast with classical wage relevant goals
such as bonuses. The psychologists argued that introducing a goal that was di¢ cult
but attainable, would increase the challenge of the job while making it clear to the
workers what was expected from them. Although the managers were quite skeptical at
the beginning, the results were surprising: the performance of logging crews increased
18% and the rms prots rose as well.3
This example was followed by many studies in the psychology literature on what is
known as "goal setting" (e.g., Yukl & Latham (1978), Shane et al. (2003), Anderson et
al. (2010)).4 The theory states that performance goals are an important determinant
2This and other Henry Ford quotes are available at http://www.iwise.com/R5gdr.
3We can nd this study in Latham & Locke (1979), which also includes similar empirical evidence
for the case study with typists.
4In management literature, goal setting is known as "management by objectives" (MBO). Several
studies nd empirical evidence that MBO programs improve workersperformance (e.g., Ivancevich
(1974), Bush (1998) and Mosley et al. (2001)).
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of employeesmotivation to work and hence a¤ect their productivity.5 (See Locke
(1997) and Locke and Latham (2002) for a literature review.)
Our purpose in this paper is to take these kind of motivation theories only ad-
dressed in psychology and management and make them precise in standard economic
theory. In particular, we propose a model where workers do have a sense of self-
accomplishment and may care about pay-o¤ irrelevant goals. This sense of accom-
plishment is di¤erent for workers with di¤erent personal standards, which is private
information to them. Thus, a worker with a high personal standard can only be
motivated to accomplish a su¢ ciently challenging (di¢ cult) goal.6
Before describing the key elements of the model, we start by summarizing the
main ndings in the goal setting literature. The most important and robust nding
is that the more di¢ cult the goal is, the greater the achievement will be. This result
applies as long as the individual is committed to the goal (i.e., he cares about it) and
has the ability to attain it.7 The reason why goals a¤ect workersachievement is that
goals a¤ect the challenge of the job and hence the satisfaction workersobtain from
5The goals studied in this literature as well as the one that we use in this paper, are non-binding
goals since they do not a¤ect the workerswage. Therefore, these goals do not directly a¤ect the
principals prots (i.e., they are payo¤ irrelevant). In contrast, binding goals (bonuses for example)
a¤ect the agents wage so they are payo¤ relevant.
6We can think of alternative explanations of the goal setting evidence. For instance, a goal may
be an implicit benchmark for being retained or for future promotions. However, it is important
to clarify a couple of things. First, regarding evidence in the workplace like our previous loggers
example, the goal setting policy signicantly increased performance even when the supervisor was
not present. In this case the supervisor could only observe the crews performance as a whole, but
not the individual performance of each worker. Second, there are numerous laboratory experiments
showing that individuals who have been assigned a specic goal solve more arithmetic problems or
assemble more tinker toys than do people without goals (See Locke (1997)). Therefore, the evidence
indicates that there is an important component of employees motivation through goal setting policies
that cannot be explained with classical economic models only.
7Our models set-up allows that higher goals lead to lower achievement. However, under certain
conditions this may not happen in equilibrium.
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the work itself. As Judge (2000) says:
The most e¤ective way an organization can promote job satisfaction of
its employees is to enhance the mental challenge in their jobs, and the most
consequential way most individuals can improve their own satisfaction is
to seek out mentally challenging work.8
Therefore, goals are an important determinant of workers satisfaction because
they help develop a sense of achievement. According to the goal setting literature,
goals serve as a reference point of self satisfaction, with harder goals leading to better
accomplishments.
Since goals are reference points, it is also plausible that a higher goal lowers
the workers satisfaction. In fact, supporting this reasoning, Mento et al. (1992)
have found that those who produce the most, those with di¢ cult goals, are the least
satised.9 The question then is why do people accept these goals? According to Locke
and Latham (2002), the driving force behind this result is that those people with high
goals demand more from themselves, thus they are dissatised with less. Therefore,
their personal standards are set at a higher level.10 Similarly, Locke, Latham &
Erez (1988) nd in an experiment that individuals accept goals if these goals are
higher than their personal standard and reject them otherwise. According to this
evidence goals a¤ect the challenge of the job di¤erently depending on the individuals
standards.
8Timothy A. Judge, Promote Job Satisfaction through Mental Challenge in The Blackwell Hand-
book of Principles of Organizational Behavior (2000, Chapter 6, page 107).
9This result applies for both, "self set" and "assigned" goals. However, it is important to remark
that through the paper we consider assigned goals instead of self set goals. Therefore, people with
di¢ cult goals are people who have accepted jobs with high goals instead of people who have set a
high goal for themselves in their jobs.
10Another example is that even if we consider researchers with the same ability. We usually
observe that some of them need to publish their papers in very high ranked journals in order to get
a sense of self-achievement while others are happy publishing in low ranked journals.
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Finally, an important empirical fact is that demanding goals are more e¤ective
with those workers whose personal standards are high. In other words, people who
demand more of themselves are the most committed to high goals.11
The previous ndings are di¢ cult to support with traditional economic models,
such as the classical principal agent model, in which only the goals that are directly
linked to the agentswage (e.g., bonuses) a¤ect their incentives to work. Our purpose
here is to ll this gap by introducing goal setting into an economic model of managerial
incentives. Therefore, we look at the following questions: Can a manager increase
the workersproductivity by using goals that are linked to the jobs challenge? How
should the manager dene the workers goals? What are the determinants of job
satisfaction?
To answer these questions we propose a principal agent model where the agents
motivation to work is twofold. First, as in standard models, the agent works in
response to extrinsic incentives, which in our model are a pay-per-performance wage.
Second, the agent has an intrinsic motivation to work because he derives an internal
sense of achievement from accomplishing goals.12 Coming back to our introductory
example, we can easily imagine harvesting timber to be a monotonous and boring
task. However, as we have seen, by setting demanding but attainable production
goals, the managers were able to increase the challenge of the job and provide the
loggers with a sense of accomplishment that increased their intrinsic motivation to
work and hence their performance. In this paper, we capture this e¤ect with a goal
payo¤ function, which measures the intrinsic satisfaction that an agent receives from
11There are other results in the goal setting literature that we do not describe because they are
beyond the scope of this paper, such as the denition of specic or explicit goals, the inuence of the
individuals self-condence on the level of the goals accepted, or the importance of feedback showing
progress for the e¤ectiveness of the goal.
12As Frey (2001) argues there are at least two kinds of worker motivation: extrinsic and intrinsic.
The extrinsic motivation is based on incentives coming from outside the worker such as his wage.
However, there are other intrinsic motives coming from inside the worker, and that apparently give
no reward except the work itself.
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his production with respect to the goal set by the principal. Thus, an agent gets a
positive goal payo¤ if he produces above and beyond the set target but a negative
goal payo¤ otherwise. Workers, however, di¤er in their perception of how challenging
goals may be. For instance, we may observe that for loggers who demand more
from themselves, only those goals that require a greater amount of timber to be
harvested will be found challenging. On the other hand, those loggers who demand
little from themselves, lower goals may be just as challenging. We model this goal
commitment e¤ect with a reference dependent function in which the reference point
is the agents own standard. In particular, we consider the standard as the point up
to which an agent considers the goal to be challenging and thus obtains a positive
goal commitment.13
In our model, agents di¤er only in their personal standards. Hence, agents with
di¤erent standards can be motivated di¤erently by the same goal because some of
them may consider it to be challenging while others do not. Therefore, the principal
will design di¤erent contracts (with di¤erent goals) for di¤erent agent types. We show
that at the optimal contract, goals are met by agents and thus they derive a positive
intrinsic utility. We also show that the agentsproduction as well as the goals set by
the principal increase with the agentsstandard. Thus, in our model, goals that are
non-binding for the agent, i.e., they are payo¤ irrelevant for the principal, increase the
principals prots with respect to the classical principal agent model with no goals.
As in classical principal agent models, the principal distorts the low types contract
in such a way that his production decreases with the standard of higher types. With
respect to the utility that agents get in equilibrium, we show two important results.
First, in our two types model we show that the utility of the high type is an inverted
U-shaped function of the agents standard. Thus, the most satised agent is a high
type with a mid-ranged standard. Second, in a three types case we show that a
13In our model, personal standards do not matter unless there are goals. As we shall see, if the
principal does not assign goals, the agents have no intrinsic motivation to work. This is a simplifying
assumption.
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mid-ranged agent type could be the one most satised. In fact, although the highest
type achieves the highest production he can receive a zero utility. The intuition is
as follows, if the highest types standard is su¢ ciently high he does not consider the
goals assigned to the other agents to be challenging, thus his informational rents are
zero.
While in recent years the problem of goal setting has become an extremely popular
topic in psychology and management, the idea of goals that are not linked to the
workerswage may have an economic e¤ect which thus far has received very little
attention. Some exceptions deserve to be mentioned. Some papers study the e¤ects
of a self-set goal to attenuate the self-control problems of dynamically inconsistent
agents. For instance, Hsiaw (2009) studies an optimal stopping problem (or a project
termination decision) with hyperbolic discounters in which there is an option value
of waiting due to uncertainty. In her model, goals, which act as a reference point
up to which agents get an additional positive utility, induce more patient behavior
by providing an additional incentive to wait for a higher realization of the projects
value. Therefore, the main result is that endogenous goal setting attenuates the
impulsiveness of an agent with present-biased time preferences. In our model we use
assigned goals in a principal agent model, which makes our research questions and
ndings completely di¤erent.
Köszegi and Rabin (2006) study a model of reference dependent preferences, where
the reference point is a persons rational expectations about outcomes. According to
this theory, agents are inuenced by a "gain-loss sense" that a¤ects the maximum
price they are willing to pay. For instance, if a consumer expects to buy a pair of
shoes, she experiences a sense of loss if she does not buy them, and this sense of loss
increases the maximum price she is willing to pay for the shoes. Daido & Itoh (2007)
introduce these preferences in an agency model. They show that under risk aversion,
the agents higher expectation allows the principal to implement greater e¤ort with
lower-powered incentives. Moreover, they obtain the two types self-fullling prophecy:
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the Galatea and the Pygmalion e¤ect. In the former an agents self-expectation about
his performance determines his actual performance, while in the latter the principals
expectation about the agents performance has an impact on the agents performance.
Although, as in our model, they study a principal agent model with agentsreference
dependent preferences, the focus of Daido and Itoh (2007) greatly di¤ers from ours.
Firstly, the results of a principal agent model with agentspreferences á la Köszegi
and Rabin (2006) can only vary from the standard model if there is common uncer-
tainty about the production function (moral hazard) and not in an adverse selection
setting like ours. And more importantly, in our model the agents reference point
(i.e., the goal) is a decision variable of the principal rather than the agents rational
expectations. This allows us to incorporate goal setting as a part of the principals
motivation policy.
Finally, this paper is related to the models that account for the individualsin-
trinsic motivation to work. For instance, Bénabou & Tirole (2003) study a principal
agent model in which the principal has better information than the agent about the
agents type. The authors show that, although performance incentives lead to an
increment of the agents e¤ort in the short run, they are negative reinforcements in
the long run. The idea is that if the principal pays a bonus to induce low ability
agents to work (i.e., the principal increases the agents "extrinsic" motivation), then
the agent perceives the bonus as a bad signal about his own ability (which reduces
his "intrinsic" motivation). Some papers have also studied the optimal incentive con-
tract when agents have intrinsic motivation. For instance, Fischer & Huddart (2008)
study a model where the agentscost of e¤ort is determined by a social norm; this
social norm makes agents work harder in response to an increment in the average
e¤ort of their peers. These norms inuence the power of nancial incentives within
an organization. In contrast with this literature, in our model the principal has a
more active role since he can directly inuence the agents intrinsic motivation by
setting the reference point of his intrinsic utility.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. In Section
3 we analyze the principal agent relationship by characterizing the optimal contract
and studying the two types and the three types cases. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We study a principal agent model with one risk-neutral employer, the principal, and
one worker, the agent. The principals utility is given by the output produced by the
agent, y, minus the wage she has to pay, w.
Output is given by the production function y = e, where e is the agents e¤ort
and  is the agents ability (i.e., his level of human capital).14 The agents disutility
of e¤ort, c (e), is a convex function. For simplicity, we assume c (e) = e
2
2
. We assume
 is observable so that, by observing output, the principal can infer the agents e¤ort.
Thus, we abstract away from moral hazard concerns. The principal o¤ers contracts
that are pairs fw; gg, where w is the wage and g is a production goal. We consider a
pay-per-performance wage, w (y), whereas the production goal is a non-binding goal
since it does not directly a¤ect the agents wage. We assume that the principal has
all the bargaining power so that the contract is a take-it-or-leave-ito¤er.
In this model, there are two ways to motivate the agent to work: an extrinsic
motivation, which is the di¤erence between the wage and the disutility of e¤ort, and
an intrinsic motivation, which is the agents sense of pride in having accomplished
goal g with the production y. Therefore, in our setting, challenging goals play the role
of inducing the individualspride. Moreover, we consider that goals a¤ect the chal-
lenge of the job di¤erently depending on what the agents demand from themselves.
We capture this e¤ect with the personal standards parameter, s, which is private
14We use a standard technology where  and e are complements. Thus, the greater the agents
ability, the greater the agents e¤ort productivity. Similar results can be obtained using an additive
function where  and e are independent.
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information for the agent, so there is an adverse selection problem. We denote by
V (y; g; s) the agents intrinsic utility function and specify the agents utility function
as
U = w (y) + V (y; g; s)  e
2
2
:
We assume that the intrinsic utility function is of the form V (y; g; s) =  (g; s) v (y; g)
if g > 0 and V (y; g; s) = 0 if g = 0.15 Where  (g; s) is the agents goal commitment,
i.e., the intensity of the intrinsic utility, and v (y; g) is the agents goal payo¤. The
goal payo¤ function v (y; g) is the satisfaction that the agent derives from accomplish-
ing output y, when his production goal is g. In order to get closed-form solutions
we assume that v (y; g) = g ln

y
g

: This function satises the following properties
consistent with empirical facts in the psychology literature:16
(i) Goal dependence: v (y; g)  0 if and only if y  g;
(ii) Monotonicity: v1 (y; g) > 0;
(iii) Complementarity: v12 (y; g) > 0; and,
(iv) Concavity: v11 (y; g) < 0.
Property (i) says that the agent obtains a positive goal payo¤ as long as he meets
the goal. Property (ii) says that, for any goal, the agents goal payo¤ increases with
output. Property (iii) states that goal and output are complements. Therefore, the
more di¢ cult attaining the goal is, the greater the marginal payo¤ from attaining
it will be.17 Finally, property (iv) says that the agents goal payo¤ is concave in
15From the argument below it is clear that function v (y; g) is not dened for g = 0. However,
lim
g!0
v (y; g) = 0. Therefore, function V (y; g; s) is continuous for all g  0.
16See Locke (1997) and Locke and Latham (2002).
17Atkinson (1958) nds that if the goals increment is impossible to attain (or the individual
believes that it is impossible), the performance can indeed decrease. Although this "inverse-U"
relationship between output and goals is very intuitive, under our conditions that goals may be
di¢ cult but attainable a complementarity relationship may best t with the evidence (see Locke
(1997)).
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production. Therefore, the marginal goal payo¤ decreases as the gap between the
agents output and the goal increases.18
As we mentioned in the introduction, a necessary condition for goals to inuence
an agents performance is that agents are committed to those goals. Although the
individualsgoal commitment is a complex theme in the related literature, here we
choose an easy and intuitive modelling strategy. The goal commitment is determined
by the interaction between goals and personal standards; high personal standards
require challenging goals in order for the agent to take pride in accomplishment.19
Formally, the goal commitment function,  (g; s), is a reference dependent function,
where s is the reference point. For simplicity we consider the following step function:
 (g; s) =
8<: s if g > s;s if g  s:
From here on we say that an agent with standard s considers goal g to be chal-
lenging when g > s. In the next proposition, we show an important property of the
goal commitment function.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium de

dg
 0 if and only if s  s.
18Imagine for instance that a researcher has the goal of publishing three research papers in top
journals. Therefore, he gets a positive intrinsic satisfaction if he attains it whereas he su¤ers if he
fails to do so (property (i)). Moreover, his satisfaction increases with the number of papers published
(property (ii)). Obviously, the sense of achievement from attaining this research goal would be lower
with an easier goal such as publishing one paper in a lower ranked journal (property (iii)). Finally, if
the researcher has already published ve papers, the increment in his intrinsic utility if he produces
another one is lower than if he only has two or three papers (property (iv)).
19There are other determinants of individuals goal commitment that we do not consider here.
For instance, there is empirical evidence that core self-evaluations such as self-steem or self-regard,
a¤ect the individualsgoal commitment (See, Judge et al. (1998)). Another important determinant
of goal commitment is the individualsparticipation in the goal setting process (See, Anderson et
al. (2010)).
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If the goal commitment is greater with a challenging goal than with a non-
challenging one, the agents e¤ort does not decrease with the assigned goal. The
intuition is simple, since higher goals increase goal commitment, agents are more
motivated to get goal payo¤, so they work harder in response to goals. As we have
already mentioned, the most consistent empirical fact in the goal setting literature is
that agents exert greater e¤ort in response to more challenging and attainable goals.
Therefore, from here on, we shall assume that the function  (g; s) satises:
(v) Challenging goals are motivational: s  s = 0:20
Note that because of assumption (v), an agent with standard s considers goal
g to be challenging (g > si) if and only if he is committed to it, i.e.,  (g; s) > 0.
This is an intuitive property stating that di¢ cult tasks are motivational,21 and it is
consistent with the ndings of Mento et al. (1992) and Locke and Latham (2002)
discussed in the introduction, in which the agentsstandards are the reference points
of their (intrinsic) satisfaction. Moreover note that our goal commitment function
satises another empirical nding which was discussed in the introduction,
(vi) Demanding agents are more committed to challenging goals:  2 (g; s)  0 i¤
g > s.
As we will see in the next section, this property is important in order to sort
agentstypes.
Therefore the agents utility function is given by
U =
8<: w + sg ln

y
g

  e2
2
if g > s;
w   e2
2
if g  s:
(1)
20Our main results still apply if we consider a more general function where s  s > 0.
21A similar interpretation would be that a strong commitment to goals is attained when the agent
is convinced that they are important, and demanding agents only consider challenging goals to be
important (Locke (1997) page 119).
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Note that U is discontinuous. If g  s, the agent obtains zero intrinsic utility;
whereas, if g > s, he obtains positive intrinsic utility when y > g. Thus, in order to
get a positive intrinsic motivation (V (y; g; s) > 0), an agent not only needs su¢ ciently
high production (y > g) to receive a positive goal payo¤, but also a su¢ ciently high
goal (g > s) to get a positive goal commitment.
The principal does not observe the agents standard, thus, we have an adverse
selection problem. For simplicity we begin by assuming that the personal standard
can take two values s 2 fsL; sHg, where s = sH with probability p. In Section 3:4,
we extend the analysis to three agent types.
3 The Principal-Agent Relationship
We begin the analysis by characterizing the optimal contract o¤ered by the principal
to an agent with goal dependent preferences. Applying the revelation principle, the
principal designs one contract for each agent type, fw; gg = f(wL; wH) ; (gL; gH)g. Let
us dene U (si; sj) = wj + V (yj; gj; si)   e
2
j
2
as the utility of an agent with standard
si choosing the contract o¤ered to an agent with standard sj. The principal chooses
a wage structure w and sets production goals g that induce e¤orts e = (eL; eH)
to maximize expected prot subject to the agents participation (IR) and incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints. Thus, the principals problem is
max
fw;gg
p(yH   wH) + (1  p) (yL   wL)
subject to, for all i; j 2 fL;Hg
wi + V (yi; gi; si)  e
2
i
2
 0; (IR)
wi + V (yi; gi; si)  e
2
i
2
 wj + V (yj; gj; si) 
e2j
2
: (IC)
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Our rst result states that the agent gets a non-negative intrinsic utility in equi-
librium.
Lemma 1 Given a contract fw; gg, in equilibrium V (yi; gi; si)  0:
The intuition is simple: if agents get a positive intrinsic utility from their job, it
is easier to make them participate. If agents receive a negative intrinsic utility, the
principal has to pay them higher wages to assure their participation. This can be
avoided if the principal o¤ers non-challenging goals (gi  si) to the agents in such a
way that they are not committed to goals ( (gi; si) = 0) : Thus, their intrinsic utility
is zero (V (yi; gi; si) = 0).22
In order to solve the model, we need to identify a monotonicity or single crossing
condition for the utility function that allows us to sort agent types. Note that this is
not obvious in our environment because of the discontinuity of the utility function.
We rst show that the agent with the high standard will be the one who obtains the
highest surplus in equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Given a contract fw; gg, in equilibrium U (sH ; sH)  U (sL; sL) :
By Lemma 2, we can apply standard results in principal agent models which state
that the individual rationality of the low type, IRL, and the incentive compatibility
constraints of the high type, ICH , are binding in equilibrium. Because of this, the
next proposition follows.
22Therefore, this result is a consequence of our assumption that s = 0. Thus, agents get zero goal
commitment,  (g; s), when goals are not challenging for them (gi  si). If s > 0, it is possible that
in equilibrium V (yi; gi; si) < 0 for some agent i. Therefore, we should study more cases, but our
qualitative results would remain unchanged.
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Proposition 2 Given a contract fw; gg, in equilibrium, IRL and ICH bind, i.e.,
U (sL; sL) = 0; and
U (sH ; sH) = U (sH ; sL) =
8<: gL ln

eL
gL

(sH   sL) if gL > sH ;
0 if gL  sH :
The low type agent gets zero surplus in equilibrium, and the high type obtains
informational rents when the low types goal is challenging for him (i.e., gL > sH).
Otherwise, the high type agent receives no intrinsic utility from taking the low type
contract. Thus, the principal does not need to pay him informational rents.
The next lemma provides a useful result regarding the agentsintrinsic utility in
equilibrium.
Lemma 3 Given a contract fw; gg, in equilibrium, for all i 2 fL;Hg,
(i) V (yi; gi; si) > 0 if and only if yi > si;
(ii) V (yi; gi; si) = 0 if and only if yi  si:
By Lemma 3, we know that the agent gets a challenging job in equilibrium, and
hence a positive intrinsic utility, if and only if the agents production is greater than
his standard. This is because when y > s, the principal can design a goal which is
both challenging (g > s) and can be successfully accomplished by the agent (y > g).
Note that this is the best situation for the principal because IR constraints are relaxed
and the principal can o¤er lower wages. However, if y < s, there is no way to design
a goal that is both challenging and can be successfully accomplished by the agent. In
this case, the principal prefers to o¤er non-challenging goals in order to avoid negative
intrinsic utilities.
Since y = e; by Lemma 3, it is immediate that when the agents ability, , is
high, the principal can always o¤er a challenging goal to both agent types. This is
the content of the next corollary.
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Corollary 1 Given a contract fw; gg and the agents standard si, if  is su¢ ciently
high, in equilibrium, V (yi; gi; si) > 0 for all i 2 fL;Hg.
To simplify the analysis, from here on we assume that the condition in Corollary
1 holds, so that agents are intrinsically motivated in equilibrium.23
Before setting the equilibrium contracts, we begin by studying the two cases that
may arise in equilibrium (see Proposition 2): an informational rents case, in which
the high type agent gets a positive utility in equilibrium, and a rent extraction case,
in which both agents obtain a zero utility in equilibrium.
3.1 The Informational Rents Case
As a starting point, we assume that there is an equilibrium in which the low types goal
is challenging for the high type agent (gL > sH), so that he gets positive informational
rents. Then, applying Proposition 2, we have
U (sH ; sL) = gL ln

eL
gL

(sH   sL) > U (sL; sL) = 0:
Therefore, the equilibrium of the model is given by the solution to the principals
problem, where the binding constraints can be rewritten as
wL =
e2L
2
  sLgL ln

eL
gL

; (IRL)
wH =
e2H
2
  sHgH ln

eH
gH

+ gL ln

eL
gL

(sH   sL) : (ICH)
Denoting by e Eulers number, the solution to the principals problem is
eH = 

1 +
sH
e

and gH =


e
2
(e+ sH) ;
eL = 

1 +
sL   psH
(1  p) e

and gL =


e
2
e+
sL   psH
(1  p)

:
23In the appendix we study the cases that do not satisfy the condition of Corollary 5. We skip
these cases here because results are very similar and the intuitions are the same.
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Figure 1 shows some comparative statics. We x the standard of the low type and
we plot the results as a function of the high type standard. This allow us to see the
e¤ect of the high type standard on the low type contract and hence the informational
rents.
Figure 1. The solution with positive informational rents
Since Corollary 1 is satised, i.e., agents are committed to goals in equilibrium, it
is immediate that the principal sets goals that maximize the agents goal payo¤ given
his production, gi = argmax
g
: v (yi; g), thus gi =
yi
e
. Therefore, the principal sets
goals that agents can accomplish, yi > gi. The idea is that the principal uses goals to
maximize the agents intrinsic utility in order to pay lower wages. As we can see in
Figure 1, the high types e¤ort, eH , as well as his goal, gH , increase with his standard,
sH . The rationale behind this result is clear: as the agentsstandards increase, the
principal o¤ers them jobs with demanding goals. By doing so, the principal motivates
agents to work hard so that they can reach a high production level. For the low type,
both his e¤ort and his goal decrease with the high type standard, sH . The principal
distorts the contract o¤ered to the low type in order to extract greater surplus from
the high type. As sH increases, the high type is more important than the low type
for the principal, so he further distorts the low type contract. For the same reason,
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the lower the proportion of high types, p, the lower the distortion of the low type
contract will be. In fact, if p = 0, there is no distortion at all.
We can see in Figure 1 that as the high types standard increases, the production
of the high (low) type increases (decreases) at a higher rate than his assigned goal.
Thus, in equilibrium, the intrinsic utility of the high (low) type agent is an increasing
(decreasing) function of the high types standard.24 Therefore, the principal distorts
the low types contract so that his goal payo¤, v (yL; gL), decreases with sH .
Regarding the high types informational rents, we have the following trade-o¤:
On the one hand, as the high types standard increases, the agents goal commitment
increases as well. This has a direct positive e¤ect on the informational rents. On
the other hand, we have a negative e¤ect, since the greater the high types standard
is, the more will be the principals distortion of the low types contract, so that
the utility extracted by the high type when choosing the low type contract is lower.
Formally, the informational rents function is v (yL; gL) (sH   sL), where the second
part is increasing in sH and v (yL; gL) decreases with sH as we have just shown. Due
to the concavity of the goal payo¤ function, the negative e¤ect dominates the positive
e¤ect when sH is su¢ ciently high. This is the intuition of the inverted U shape of
the informational rents function illustrated in Figure 1.25
To complete the characterization of the contract, we depict the equilibrium wages
in Figure 2.
24These results hold true if assumptions (i) and (ii) on the function v (y; g) hold.
25We can easily check that with a linear goal payo¤ function the informational rents function is
concave and increasing in sH .
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Figure 2. The wages with positive informational rents
Let us recall that from IRL that
wL =
e2L
2
  V (yL; gL; sL) :
Thus, the low type agents wage equals the disutility of e¤ort minus his intrinsic
utility. As we have seen, the low type agents e¤ort, as well as his goal and his
intrinsic utility, decrease with the high types standard, sH . Due to the concavity of
the intrinsic utility function and the convexity of the disutility of e¤ort, the reduction
of the intrinsic utility e¤ect dominates the reduction of e¤ort e¤ect if sH is su¢ ciently
high, so that wL has a U-shaped form.
Similarly, from ICH ,
wH =
e2H
2
+ U (sH ; sL)  V (yH ; gH ; sH) :
Thus, the wage of the high type agent equals the disutility of e¤ort plus the infor-
mational rents minus the intrinsic utility. As we know, the high type agents e¤ort,
as well as his goal and intrinsic utility, increase with sH . If sH is su¢ ciently high
the intrinsic utility e¤ect dominates the increment in the disutility of e¤ort and the
informational rents e¤ect, so that wH presents an inverted U-shaped form.
Note that if sH is su¢ ciently high wages are negative. It is immediate that an
agent with no intrinsic motivation (i.e., V () = 0) and zero productivity (i.e.,  = 0)
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receives a zero wage in this model. Therefore, a negative wage means that an in-
trinsically motivated agent could get a lower wage than an agent with no intrinsic
motivation.26
3.2 The Rent Extraction Case
Here we study the case in which the low type goal is not challenging for the high type
(gL  sH) whereas the high type is given a challenging goal (gH > sH). Therefore,
the informational rents are zero. Note that this case is equivalent to the perfect
information case. Moreover, remember that because of Corollary 1 the agents get a
challenging goal (g1 > si) in equilibrium. Hence we can rewrite the IRL and ICH
constraints as
wL =
e2L
2
  sLgL ln

eL
gL

; (IRL)
wH =
e2H
2
  sHgH ln

eH
gH

: (ICH)
Therefore, the solution of the principals problem is, for all i 2 fL;Hg
ei = 

1 +
si
e

;
gi =


e
2
(e+ si) ;
For both agent types, the e¤ort, ei, as well as his goal, gi, increase with his
standard, si. In this case, the low types contract does not depend on the high types
standard. In other words, the principal does not distort the low types contract as in
the previous case.
26Note that in our model an agent with no intrinsic motivation always gets a zero utility in
equilibrium. However, an intrinsically motivated agent may get a positive utility in the form of
informational rents.
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3.3 The Optimal Contract
In this section, we characterize the optimal contract o¤ered by the principal. Propo-
sition 2 states that one of the two cases studied above may arise in equilibrium: the
informational rent case and the rent extraction case. While in the former the low
types goal is challenging for the high type agent, and hence he gets positive infor-
mational rents, in the latter the low types goal is non-challenging for the high type
and thus the principal can extract the entire surplus of both agentstypes. Let us
consider the informational rents case depicted in Figure 1. In this case, the high type
agent is committed to the low types goal, thus gL > sH so that  (gL; sH) > 0. As sH
increases, gL decreases, therefore there is sH = sI such that both variables coincides.
Thus  (gL; sH) = 0, which is the rent extraction case.
Note that, in equilibrium, the goal o¤ered to the high type agent, and hence
his e¤ort, has the same functional form independently of whether he gets positive
informational rents or not, while the contract of the low type is di¤erent in the two
situations.27 The next gure illustrates the low types production and his assigned
goal as well as the informational rents as a function of the high types standard, sH .
27This is the standard "non distortion at the top, distortion at the bottom" result in adverse
selection models.
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Figure 3. Low type equilibrium.
Thus, if sH 2 (sL; sI), we are in the informational rents case; whereas, if sH  sI ,
we are in the rent extraction case. If sH 2 [sI ; sII ], we have a corner solution in which
gL = sH , while if sH > sII then gL > sH .28 The next proposition fully characterizes
the equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Given p 2 (0; 1) and sL  0, the optimal production goals are
gH =


e
2
(e+ sH) , gL =
8>>><>>>:
 

e
2 
e+ sL psH
(1 p)

if sH 2 (sL; sI) ;
sH if sH 2 [sI ; sII ] ; 

e
2
(e+ sL) if sH > sII :
28All the technical details are relegated to the Appendix, in which we additionally provide the
solution of the cases that violate the condition of Corollary 1, for all of which the high type agent
gets zero informational rents.
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While the optimal e¤orts provided by agents are
eH = 

1 +
sH
e

, eL =
8>>><>>>:


1 + sL psH
(1 p)e

if sH 2 (sL; sI) ;
+
p
4sLsH+
2
2
if sH 2 [sI ; sII ] ;

 
1 + sL
e

if sH > sII ;
where sI =
2(sL+e(1 p))
p2+e2(1 p) and sII =
 

e
2
(e+ sL).
The optimal contract gives the maximum informational rents to the high type
agent when he has an intermediate standard. This result arises for two reasons.
Firstly, because of the inverted U -shaped informational rent function discussed pre-
viously, thus if sH is su¢ ciently high with respect to sL, the principal distorts the
low type contract so much that the informational rents decrease with sH . Secondly,
because if sH  sI , the low type goal designed by the principal is not challenging for
the high type and so his intrinsic utility when taking the low type contract (i.e., the
informational rents) is zero. Therefore, an agent gets a zero surplus if he is a low
type, or he is so demanding that the low type goal is not challenging enough to derive
pride in accomplishing it.
It is straightforward to show that in our principal agent model with no goals,
which leads to V () = 0, the e¤ort exerted by the agent is e = . In our model
we have shown that while goal setting is payo¤ irrelevant since it does not directly
a¤ects the agentswage, it does increase the agents output and hence the principals
prots. Moreover we have shown that the higher the agents standard, the greater
the principals prots will be.
3.4 The Three Types Model
Here we show that the model can be easily extended to a three types case, i.e.,
s 2 fsL; sM ; sHg with sH > sM > sL > 0. First of all, we can check that Lemma
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1, Lemma 3 and hence Corollary 1 apply as well to the three types case.29 For sim-
plicity we consider that the condition of Corollary 1 satises such that in equilibrium
V (yi; gi; si) > 0. In the next proposition, we nd which constraints bind.
Proposition 4 Given a contract fw; gg = f(wL; wM ; wH) ; (gL; gM ; gH)g, in equilib-
rium, IRL and ICM;L and ICH;M bind, i.e.,
U (sL; sL) = 0;
U (sM ; sM) = U (sM ; sL) =
8<: gL ln

eL
gL

(sM   sL) if gL 2 (sM ; sH) ;
0 if gL  sM :
U (sH ; sH) = U (sH ; sM) =
8<: gM ln

eM
gM

(sH   sM) if gM > sH ;
0 if gM  sH :
Therefore, our previous results with two agent types are robust to the case of
three types. Note that, when gL 2 (sM ; sH) and gM  sH , the medium type will
obtain positive informational rents while the high type will not. Hence, with three
consumer types, a mid-ranged agent (not only a mid-ranged standard of the high
type as before) could be the most satised.
Note that in the classical principal agent model the highest type, the most produc-
tive one, has the highest informational rents. However, in our model, the agent who
produces the most the one with the highest standard may have zero informational
rents when he does not consider lower goals to be challenging. In other words, being
very demanding can be detrimental.
There is evidence of this e¤ect. In an experiment with undergraduate students,
Mento et al. (1992) found that the highest degree of satisfaction is reached by students
with a grade goal of C (i.e., students with a mediocre standard) while the lowest one
29These results are a consequence of our goal dependent utility function specication rather than
the number of agent types.
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was attained by students with a grade goal of A (i.e., students with a very high
standard). Our results are in line with this empirical evidence.
4 Conclusion
Psychologists and experts in management have long documented the importance of
goal setting in worker motivation. In particular, they have found that when workers
are committed to challenging but attainable goals, their performance increases even
if those goals are not directly linked to wages. In this paper, we have introduced goal
setting in a principal agent model of managerial incentives. Agents care about goal
setting because achieving those goals creates a sense of pride in accomplishment that
modies their intrinsic motivation to work. We have shown that, in an optimal con-
tract, more challenging objectives increase agentsperformance and that the goals set
by the principal increase with the agents standard. Therefore, goals that are payo¤
irrelevant, since they do not directly a¤ect agentsextrinsic incentives, increase the
principals prots. We have also shown that a mid-ranged standard gives the highest
satisfaction to an agent and that a mid-ranged agent type could be the most satised
among all the agent types. Therefore, being very demanding can be detrimental.
There are some promising lines for future research. First of all, our goal commit-
ment function is a very simple one; an agent is committed to a goal when it exceeds
his personal standard su¢ ciently for him to consider the goal to be challenging. Psy-
chologists have found that there are other determinants of goal commitment that
should be studied in an economic model, such as the agentsself-e¢ cacy (i.e., ability
condence) and the agentsparticipation in the goal setting processes (See Anderson
et al. (2010) and Bush (1998)).
A very interesting line of future research is to endogenize the personal standard
parameter. There are several ways to do this. First, in a model with di¤erent abilities
we can imagine that the agents standard is in part determined by his ability. Second,
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we can think that the personal standard is determined by the agents rational expec-
tation about outcomes. This would provide a very good link between the present
model with goal dependent preferences and the reference dependent utility from ex-
pectations literature (such as models with preferences à la Köszegi and Rabin (2006)).
In fact goal setting provides an additional explanation of the formation of reference
states. For instance, with an experimental study Matthey (2010) nds evidence that
apart from an individuals own past, present and expected future outcomes and the
outcomes of relevant others, reference states also depend on environmental factors
that do not inuence outcomes, i.e., they are payo¤ irrelevant like the goals studied
in this paper.
Another topic would be to introduce competition in the model. If we consider that
rms compete for workers, we should reconsider our result that very demanding (and
hence productive) agents may be the least satised. With competition we should have
two opposite e¤ects. On the one hand, we have the e¤ect studied in this paper that
very demanding workers may get lower satisfaction than lower types. But, on the
other hand, rms compete for more demanding agents o¤ering them higher wages,
which has a positive e¤ect on the satisfaction of very demanding agents.
Finally, there is evidence that goal setting policies have more impact on agents
performance as time goes by. In particular, Ivancevich (1974) nds that in a manufac-
turing company a goal setting program signicantly improves workersperformance
within six months after implementation. Therefore, it would be interesting to extend
our model to allow for dynamic considerations. One possibility is to allow personal
standards to be positively related with past goals.
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6 APPENDIX
Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Proposition 1
Firstly we show the if part. Thus, given v (y; g), if si  s then dedg  0. Note that
si  s implies that  1 (g; si)  0. This, jointly with the complementarity condition,
i.e., v12 (y; g)  0, imply that dUdedg  0 which means that dedg  0. Now we show the
only if part, if de

dg
 0 then si  s. Note that dedg  0 implies that e¤ort and goals
are complements, i.e., dU
dedg
 0, which, given v (y; g), implies that  1 (g; si)  0, i.e.,
si  s. Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is by way of contradiction. Let fw; gg be a contract such that y < g
(i.e., v (y; g) < 0), so that V (y; g; s) =  (g; s) v (y; g) < 0 as  (g; s) > 0. The utility
of the agent in such a contract is
U = w + V (y; g; s)  c < w   c:
Because of this, one can design a contract

wd; gd
	
with gd < s (i.e.,  
 
gd; s

= 0)
and wd < w, which is feasible since Ud = wd   c  U; and gives larger prots to the
principal, as wd < w and yd = y. Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 2
Given a x pair of agentsstandards fsL; sHg, all the possible cases that can arise
are:
(i)max fgL; gHg  sL; (ii) gL  sL < sH  gH ; (iii) sL < gL  sH < gH ;
(iv)min fgL; gHg > sH ; (v) gH < sL < gL; (vi) gL  sL  gH  sH ; (vii) sL 
fgL; gHg  sH ; (viii) sL < gH < sH < gL:
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First we show that (vi) - (viii) will not emerge in an optimal contract. In (vi) -
(viii), V (yH ; gH ; sL) > 0 as gH > sL and we have
U (sL; sH) = wH + sLv (yH ; gH)  e
2
H
2
> wH   e
2
H
2
= U (sH ; sH) :
Therefore, as is standard in principal-agent models, in equilibrium, the optimal fw; gg
satises IR binding for the "low" type (here H) and IC binding for the "high" type
(here L), i.e., U (sH ; sH) = 0 and U (sL; sL) = U (sL; sH) > 0: However, the following
contract is feasible and yields higher prots to the principal
wd; gd
	
=
 
wdL; wH

;
 
gL; g
d
H
	
;
where gdH < sL (i.e., V (sL; sH) = 0), w
d
L =
e2L
2
< wL =
e2L
2
+ sLv (yH ; gH) and 
ydL; y
d
H

= (yL; yH). Consequently, (vi) - (viii) can be ruled out.
Regarding the remaining cases, note that only in case (iv) we may have positive
informational rents because gL > sH . In the other cases, (i) ; (ii), (iii) and (v),
it is immediate that, in equilibrium, the principal can extract the entire agents
surplus so that U (sH ; sH) = U (sL; sL) = 0. Therefore, the monotonicity condition,
U (sH ; sH)  U (sL; sL), is satised in all cases (i)  (v). Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 2
By IR and IC the contract fw; gg must satisfy U (sL; sL) = 0 and U (sH ; sH) =
U (sH ; sL). Therefore, U (sH ; sL) =  (gL; sH) v (yL; gL), where  (gL; sH) > 0 i¤
gL > sH . Q:E:D:
Proof of Lemma 3
By Lemma 1, any optimal contract fw; gg satises V (yi; gi; si)  0, thus V (yi; gi; si)
is either positive or zero.
(i) First note that the if part, V (yi; gi; si) > 0 =) yi > si, follows straight-
forwardly. We show the only if part by contradiction. Suppose that yi > si =)
V (yi; gi; si) = 0.
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For the low type we have yL > sL =) V (yL; gL; sL) = 0, thus gL  sL since
 (gL; sL) = 0. The following deviation is feasible and yields higher prots,
wd; gd
	
=
 
wdL; wH

;
 
gdL; gH
	
;
where gdL 2 (sL; sH) (i.e., V (yL; gL; sL) > 0 and V (yL; gL; sH) = 0), wdL = wL  
V (yL; gL; sL) and
 
ydL; y
d
H

= (yL; yH).
For the high type if yH > sH =) V (yH ; gH ; sH) = 0, thus gH  sH since
 (gH ; sH) = 0. The following deviation is feasible and yields higher prots,
wd; gd
	
=
 
wL; w
d
H

;
 
gL; g
d
H
	
;
where gdH  sH (i.e., V (yH ; gH ; sH) > 0), wdH = wH   V (yH ; gH ; sH) and
 
ydL; y
d
H

=
(yL; yH). Moreover Ud (sL; sL) = U (sL; sL) = 0 by Proposition 2:
(ii) First note that the if part, V (yi; gi; si) = 0 =) yi  si, follows straight-
forwardly. We show the only if part by contradiction. Suppose that yi  si =)
V (yi; gi; si) > 0, thus si < gi since  (gi; si) > 0. Therefore yi < gi which leads to
V (yi; gi; si) < 0. Q:E:D:
Proof of Corollary 1
Immediate from Lemma 3. Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 3
Under the condition of Corollary 1 we have that V (yi; gi; si) > 0 so that gi > si for
all i. Therefore we have four possible cases: (i) sL < gL < sM < gM < sH < gH , (ii)
sL < gL < sM < sH < min fgM ; gHg, (iii) sL < sM < min fgL; gHg < sH < gH and
(iv) sL < sM < gM < sH < min fgH ; gLg. However, case (iv) will not emerge in an
optimal contract because it does not satisfy incentive compatibility since U (sM ; sL) =
wL + sMv (yL; gL)  e
2
L
2
> wL + sLv (yL; gL)  e
2
L
2
= U (sL; sL).
Note that in case (i) agents do not get any intrinsic utility from imitate the oth-
ers. Therefore agents do not get informational rents and in equilibrium, U (sL; sL) =
31
U (sM ; sM) = U (sH ; sH) = 0. In case (ii) type H is committed to the goal of typeM ,
therefore applying standard results in principal agent models we have that in equi-
librium U (sH ; sH) = gM ln

eM
gM

(sH   sM) > U (sM ; sM) = U (sL; sL) = 0. Finally
in case (iii) we have that type M is committed to the goal of type L. Therefore,
in equilibrium, U (sM ; sM) = gL ln

eL
gL

(sM   sL) > U (sH ; sH) = U (sL; sL) = 0.
Q:E:D:
Proof of Proposition 4
I follow the same argument used in the proofs of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2.
Q:E:D:
The Principal Agent Solution
The Optimal Contract when V (yi; gi; si) > 0 for all i 2 fL;Hg.
We rst solve the principal agent model under the condition of Corollary 1, i.e.,
V (yi; gi; si) > 0 for all i 2 fL;Hg. Therefore, cases (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 2 are
the only possible cases. Note that now, depending on the location of gL we may have
the following cases in equilibrium.
Assume rst gL < sH . In this case the participation constraint is binding for both
agent types. Therefore, the principals problem simplies to:
max
feH ;gH ;eL;gLg
p(eH   wH) + (1  p) (eL   wL)
subject to
wL =
e2L
2
  sLgL ln

eL
gL

;
wH =
e2H
2
  sHgH ln

eH
gH

:
Denoting by e to the Eulers number, the solution of this problem is:
eH = 

1 +
sH
e

and gH =


e
2
(e+ sH) ;
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eL = 

1 +
sL
e

and gL =


e
2
(e+ sL) :
Note that this case is not feasible when sH and sL are su¢ ciently close, i.e., if 

e
2
(e+ sL)  sH . Under this situation the principal may want to set gL = sH , so
that the high type agent still gets zero information surplus, this is the next situation
we analyze. By substituting in the principals problem gL by sH and solving the new
principals problem we get that the contract o¤ered to the high type is the same as
the previous case, while the contract o¤ered to the low type is
eL =
1
2

 +
p
2 + 4sLsH

and gL = sH :
Assume nally gL > sH : In this case the high type gets positive informational
rents in equilibrium, thus,
U (sH ; sL) = gL ln

eL
gL

(sH   sL) > U (sL; sL) = 0:
Therefore, the principals problem becomes:
max
feH ;gH ;eL;gLg
p(eH   wH) + (1  p) (eL   wL)
subject to
wL =
e2L
2
  sLgL ln

eL
gL

;
wH =
e2H
2
  sHgH ln

eH
gH

+ gL ln

eL
gL

(sH   sL) :
The solution of this problem is the following:
eH = 

1 +
sH
e

and gH =


e
2
(e+ sH) ;
eL = 

1 +
sL   psH
(1  p) e

and gL =


e
2
e+
sL   psH
(1  p)

:
The Optimal Contract in the remaining cases.
Previously we have solved cases (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 2, here we proceed by
solving cases (i) ; (ii) and (v).
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 Case (i): max fgL; gHg  sL:
In this case the intrinsic utility of both agent types is zero, thus
V (yi; gi; si) = 0 for all i 2 fL;Hg
Therefore, applying Proposition 2, we have that the principals problem is
max
feH ;yH ;eL;yLg
p(eH   wH) + (1  p) (eL   wL)
subject to
wL =
e2L
2
;
wH =
e2H
2
:
The solution of this problem is
eH = eL = ;
wH = wL =
2
2
:
 Case (ii): gL  sL < sH  gH :
In this case we have that V (yH ; gH ; sH) = sHgH ln

eH
gH

> 0 while V (yL; gL; sL) =
0. By Proposition 2 we know that in this case the high type gets zero informational
rents. Therefore, the principals problem is
max
feH ;yH ;eL;yLg
p(eH   wH) + (1  p) (eL   wL)
subject to
wL =
e2L
2
;
wH =
e2H
2
  sHgH ln

eH
gH

:
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The solution entails
eL = ; eH = 

1 +
sH
e

;
with
gH =


e
2
(e+ sH) :
 Case (v): gH < sL < gL:
In this case we have that V (yH ; gH ; sH) = 0 while V (yL; gL; sL) = sLgL ln

eL
gL

>
0. By Proposition 2 we know that in this case the high type gets zero informational
rents. Therefore, the principals problem is
max
feH ;yH ;eL;yLg
p(eH   wH) + (1  p) (eL   wL)
subject to
wL =
e2L
2
  sLgL ln

eL
gL

;
wH =
e2H
2
:
Whose solution is
eH = ; eL = 

1 +
sL
e

;
with
gL =


e
2
(e+ sH) :
In the following graph we plot the equilibrium prots as a function of , to order
all the possible cases.
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Figure 4. Prots as function of :
Since goals are an increasing function of , if we rank the cases with respect to ,
keeping the other parameters constant, we have that the rst case, i.e., the one that
emerges when  is very low, is case (i). The interior solution of this case emerges
when  2 (0; bsI), while if  2 (bsI ; bsII) we have a corner solution in which.gL = sL.
After this case we have either case (ii) or (v) depending on the other parameter
values, it is immediate to check that both cannot hold simultaneously. The interior
solution of these cases emerges when  2 (bsII ; bsIII), while if  2 (bsIII ; bsIV ) we have
a corner solution, i.e., either gH = sH or gL = sL. Finally, when  is su¢ ciently
high we have the cases studied in the previous section, i.e., cases (iii) and (iv). The
interior solution of case (iii) emerges when  2 (bsIV ; bsV ), if  2 (bsV ; bsV I) we have
that gL = sH , and if  > bsV I we are in case (iv) which is the only case in which the
high type agent gets positive informational rents.
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